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UNDERSTANDING VOICE: WRITING IN A 
JUDICIAL CONTEXT 
Andrea McArdle 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When we read a judicial opinion, does it “sound” in a distinc-
tive and recognizable way?  To put it differently, does a judicial 
opinion have a “voice,” and if so, what are its attributes? Is voice 
defined by the opinion’s genre  (that is, the writing), the writer, or 
both? What is the relationship between voice and rhetoric? Is 
there an independent value in using voice, as distinguished from 
a consideration of rhetoric, as an analytic or interpretive tool? If 
so, how does attention to the concept of voice add to a reader’s 
interpretive resources? 
In this Article, I address these questions by discussing and 
modeling an approach for understanding judicial voice. I begin in 
part II by examining various conceptualizations of voice in       
literary writing and suggest how voice, when embraced as a    
central metaphor in written discourse, is a complex, multifaceted 
concept. I then consider how various understandings of voice have 
been imported into the analysis of legal writing. From there, I 
introduce judicial voice, and identify two complementary          
dimensions: One (genre-based) is tied to the recurring features of 
appellate opinions and other writings (advocacy briefs and bench 
memoranda) that stand in textual relation to these opinions; the 
other (authorial) is linked to an opinion author’s signature rhetor-
ical choices and expressive style. I suggest that we should avoid 
thinking of judicial opinion voice as either simply genre-based or 
authorial but instead adopt a “both/and” formulation, which    
locates judicial opinion voice in both the writing and the writer.  
In part III, I develop an analytic framework that includes 
both of these dimensions of voice. To structure this part, I begin 
with three textually related judicial writing contexts: the bench 
  
 . © 2015, Andrea McArdle.  All rights reserved. Professor of Law, CUNY School of 
Law. 
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memo, the advocacy brief, and the judicial opinion. For each of 
these writing contexts, I address those aspects of voice that are 
tied to the writing itself—that is, genre-based voice.  In addition 
to this genre-structured discussion, in this part, I consider its 
complement, authorial voice. I examine when it finds expression 
in the bench memo and advocacy brief, and then suggest ways in 
which to identify authorial voice in the judicial opinion. Here I 
argue that, in any judicial opinion, authorial voice is never singu-
lar but comprises multiple voices, including, potentially, those of 
other judges, judicial clerks, and advocates.  
I apply the framework in part IV to illuminate an opinion’s 
doctrinal reasoning, and illustrate with close analysis of three 
Supreme Court opinions. Here I show that there is good reason 
for writers and readers of judicial writing to develop a sensibility 
about judicial opinion voice. I argue that using genre-based and 
authorial voice as an analytic resource can aid understanding of a 
writing’s overall cogency, or lack thereof.  First, in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1 attending to 
the judicial voice helps illuminate the development of a jointly 
authored main opinion including the challenges of writing by 
“committee.”  Analyzing judicial voice in two other Supreme Court 
opinions draws attention to interpretive problems and tensions in 
legal doctrine, including gaps and contradictions in reasoning or 
tendencies in an opinion to strain doctrine to fit the facts.2  
I conclude that becoming attuned to how an opinion is voiced, 
and resonates, is an independently important analytic tool:      
Because it operates aurally and allows us to make our way past 
surface rhetoric, the dimension of voice can aid our understanding 
of a judicial writing’s deeper structures of meaning. 
II.  VOICE: OF TEXTS AND AUTHORS           
In the literature of writing about writing, the idea of a     
writer’s voice has long occupied commentators.3 In line with some 
  
 1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 2. See infra sec. IV(A)–(B). 
 3. For some, the pressing question is whether voice, if understood as an expression of 
an individual author, is an appropriate focus of inquiry at all. Theorists from New Critics 
to post-structuralists have disputed the importance of the author; instead, these schools of 
thought argue that the written text, not the author, is the source of meaning and touch-
stone for interpretation. Peter Elbow, Introduction, in LANDMARK ESSAYS ON VOICE AND 
WRITING xiii, xviii (Peter Elbow ed., 1994).  
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theorists’ de-emphasis of the author is a social constructionist 
view that written discourse is the product of one’s culture and 
social (including professional) community, which subsumes many 
individual voices.4 Further, despite the familiarity of voice in the 
context of spoken speech, identifying attributes of a writer’s voice 
is a complex undertaking; depending on the theorist, it can em-
brace expression that is truly personal in the sense of writing that 
is indistinguishable from the person who is writing,5 or writing by 
a persona, in the sense of a role or disguise that a writer adopts 
and adapts to the purpose for which, and the audiences to whom, 
she writes.6    
For example, some thoughtful commentary links written 
voice with a recognizable style, or signature,7 or with a tone that 
is the product of a series of linguistic gestures that result in a 
“carefully constructed artifact.”8 This view is more consistent with 
the idea of voice as persona. However, some writers suggest that 
voice is not a consciously cultivated expressive style but rather an 
attribute that a writer locates, or recovers, from within.9 For 
some, it is the result of a process of shedding or peeling away   
other cultural influences, perhaps like a kind of exfoliation, that 
makes it possible, in poet Billy Collins’s words, to “recognize the 
sound of my own writing.”10 This permission granted to oneself to 
abandon a “borrowed sensibility” and put one’s “own accents into 
the language,” as the novelist Saul Bellow once put it,11 suggests 
that the locating of one’s writing voice is a process that is person-
ally liberating. The sense that voice is bound up with one’s       
  
 4. This more deterministic view posits that an individual author does less to influ-
ence the character of writing than do these external social forces. Id. at xviii (discussing 
the views of Marxist and cultural critics); Toby Fulwiler, Looking and Listening for My 
Voice, in LANDMARK ESSAYS ON VOICE AND WRITING, supra note 1, at 157 (discussing social 
constructionist position). 
 5. Nicholas J. Aversa & Michael Tritt, Voice in Writing, 20 MCGILL J. OF EDUC. 240, 
240–42 (1985) (discussing Romantic and process theories of writing and authorship). 
 6. Id. at 243.  This more complex view, the authors indicate, is compatible with the 
idea that an individual author may have more than a single persona. Id. 
 7. Peter Elbow, What Do We Mean When We Talk About Voice in Texts?, in VOICES ON 
VOICE: PERSPECTIVES, DEFINITIONS, INQUIRY 9 (Kathleen Blake Yancey ed., 1994); see also 
BEN YAGODA, THE SOUND ON THE PAGE: STYLE AND VOICE IN WRITING at xxxi–xxxii (2004). 
 8. Fulwiler, supra note 4, at 163. 
 9. For example, Donald Murray has asserted that “[v]oice is the writer revealed.” 
Aversa & Tritt, supra note 5, at 241 (quoting DONALD MURRAY, WRITE TO LEARN 144 
(1984)). 
 10. YAGODA, supra note 8, at 123 (quoting Billy Collins). 
 11. Id. at 116 (quoting Saul Bellow). 
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individuality, revealing something distinctive and self-
authenticating about one’s use of language and thinking, has 
been linked to an expressivist orientation.12  
Scholarly inquiries about the voice of legal writing tend to 
begin from the perspective of professional role, although they also 
raise the issue of self-identifying expression. Often these inquiries 
proceed by disaggregating voice into more specific rhetorical    
dimensions. For example, commentators have drawn attention to 
the relationship between professional and personal voice,13 and 
differentiated within professional voice between common law-
oriented and scholarly legal voice.14  Christopher Rideout’s illu-
minating study distinguishes between discoursal voice and a more 
distinct authorial presence,15 which he associates with a “public” 
as contrasted with a purely personal, or private, voice.16  Drawing 
on the work of linguistics scholar Roz Ivanic, Rideout associates 
authorial presence with the idea of a writer’s self-representation 
or persona.17 Discoursal voice, by contrast, is linked to specific 
legal genres, such as appellate briefs and predictive                
memoranda.18 Writing of this kind that is part of such established 
legal genres exemplifies “typified” voice, comprising the voices of 
those who have previously contributed to these genres.19  
If legal writing voice is at minimum a professional voice,   
recognizable in part by the legal genre to which it is linked, then 
differences in writing role, context, and audience should be useful 
entry points for analyzing voice in a professional legal context. 
Moreover, if professional voice is also inflected by an author’s ex-
pressive attributes, then giving attention to authors’ rhetorical 
framing and expressive choices should enhance understanding of 
how legal writing is voiced. Starting from this more nuanced con-
ception of legal writing voice, we might then ask: Are there at-
tributes that distinguish the voice of legal writing produced in a 
judicial context?  
  
 12. For a helpful discussion of the expressivist understanding of voice in the context of 
writing pedagogy, see J. Christopher Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona in Legal Writing, 15 
LEGAL WRITING 67, 78, 82–86 (2009). 
 13. Id. at 82–86 (discussing commentary).  
 14. Julius G. Getman, Voices, 66 TEX. L. REV. 577, 578–81 (1988). 
 15. Rideout, supra note 12, at 94–95. 
 16. Id. at 101–05. 
 17. Id. at 94–97. 
 18. See id. at 86–88. 
 19. Id. at 87–89. 
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A.  Genre-Based Voice in Judicial Writing 
Drawing on the work of commentators and theorists of        
judicial writing, one entry point for responding to this query is to 
consider the more familiar genre-based idea that judicial voice is 
tied to the function of opinion writing—that is, resolving specific 
litigated claims and, in the process, developing doctrine. Often we 
associate this functional or genre-based conception of judicial 
opinion voice with the attributes of declaration and authorita-
tiveness, and a “rhetoric of inevitability.”20  Yet such a formulation 
seems incomplete because a judicial opinion encompasses more 
than the authoritative and justifying voice of the decision maker. 
An opinion also engages in persuasion; like a good advocate who 
addresses her arguments to the court, the judicial author must 
satisfy readers—and the author herself—that the opinion’s      
reasoning and results are analytically and jurisprudentially 
sound.21 And in doing so, an opinion may also draw on the ex-
planatory and analytic voice of a bench memo. For this reason, in 
the rhetorical situation of the opinion, we can identify judicial 
voice not only with judicial opinions themselves but also in rela-
tion to other modes of writing (genres)22 produced in a judicial 
context to which the opinion is related: specifically, clerk-
authored bench memos and advocate-authored briefs to the court. 
Thus, because an appellate judicial opinion will bear traces of the 
functions of bench memos and briefs that are addressed to the 
appellate court, genre-based judicial voice subsumes the features 
that we associate with the brief and the bench memo. 
  
 20. See Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 201, 210–16 (1990). 
 21. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 166–67, 
176, 216 (2000). 
 22. Theories of genre are drawn from the fields of literature, linguistics, and rhetoric. 
A long dominant conception equates genre with the classification of forms of writing. Amy 
J. Devitt, Generalizing About Genre: New Conceptions of an Old Concept, 44 C. 
COMPOSITION & COMM. 573, 574 (1993).  A more contemporary application of genre theory 
includes within the idea of genre “purposes, participants, and themes” and thus embraces 
a rhetorical and surrounding social “situation.” Id. at 575–76. Modern genre theory posits 
genre as dynamic; genre is implicated when readers respond with recognition to recurring 
situations in appropriate ways. Id. at 578–79.  At the same time, writers approaching a 
writing task must define the context and thus construct the situation involved in the task. 
Id. Under this more nuanced conception, genre is central to writing. Id. at 584.  Even 
reconceptualized as involving recurring situation or writing context rather than form, 
genre is distinguishable from the writer’s persona or expressive style, as developed infra. 
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B.  Authorial Voice in Judicial Writing 
Another entry point for analyzing judicial voice is the idea 
that voice is a manifestation of an opinion author’s own expres-
sive choices and style, a view of voice that is closer to that of a 
writer’s persona23 or public voice24 than a purely unmediated ex-
pression from within. This mode of analysis emphasizes the indi-
viduality of judicial authors and offers as evidence jurists’ writing 
that has gained a reputation as stylistically distinctive, from   
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s epigrams25 and Robert Jackson’s        
nuance26 to Antonin Scalia’s affected indignation—a variation, 
Laura Krugman Ray suggests, on the rhetorical device of the 
dramatic monologue.27  
Yet, as commentators have noted, the notion of individual   
judicial style is complicated by the role that judicial clerks often 
take on in drafting opinions.28 To be sure, judges as authors     
occupy various points on a spectrum from allowing clerks        
considerable leeway in writing initial drafts,29 to more or less   
collaborative writing relationships,30 to self-authorship.31          
  
 23. See Rideout, supra note 12, at 94–97.  
 24. See id. at 101–05. 
 25. See, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell & Thomas E. O’Connell, Book Review of: The Essential 
Holmes: Selections from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 513, 522–32 (1995); Judith Schenck Kof-
fler, Forged Alliance: Law and Literature, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1374, 1376 n.5 (1989). 
 26. Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme 
Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 208–11 (2002) [hereafter Judicial Personali-
ty]. 
 27. Id. at 226–29. 
 28. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (and Do They Matter)?, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1429–32 (1995) (arguing the judicial clerks tend to write in a “pure” 
style identified by extensive quoting and citation of authority and use of formal legal ter-
minology); Laura Krugman Ray, Judging the Justices, A Supreme Court Performance 
Review, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 209, 216–17 (2003) [hereafter Judging the Justices] (noting that 
law clerks infuse opinions with a “law review style of writing” marked by impersonality 
and extensive footnoting); see also John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 447, 487 (2001). 
 29. Peter B. Rutledge, Review Essay on Sorcerers’ Apprentices and Courtiers of 
the Marble Palace, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 396–97 (2007) (review essay on 
ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF 
LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006) and TODD C. 
PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006)). 
 30. E.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 206–11 
(1994) (outlining his preference for collaboration with clerks);YAGODA, supra note 7, at 
169–70 (discussing Justice Stephen Breyer’s approach to working with his clerks). 
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However, the practice of widespread judicial self-authorship    
dating particularly to the era when Franklin Roosevelt appointed 
distinctive judicial stylists to the Supreme Court32 does not seem 
easily replicable today. Under contemporary practice, some appel-
late courts rely not only on “elbow” or term clerks but a pool of 
staff attorneys who often author unpublished opinions to resolve 
specific cases before the court.33 
Further complicating the idea of judicial voice in this          
authorial sense is the recognition that judicial authors who      
undertake to do the principal work of writing an opinion do not 
write in a vacuum. Rather, an appellate judge who is designated 
to write an opinion must address her colleagues’ questions, com-
ments, and critiques after drafts of the opinion are circulated.34  
And when colleagues’ critiques are captured in one or more sepa-
rate opinions, often the author of the main opinion will respond 
directly to these concurring or dissenting opinions, either in the 
text of the opinion or in one or more footnotes. In addition to the 
influence that judicial colleagues bear in shaping an opinion’s 
text, judicial authors also may invoke other authors’ specific ideas 
and language, that is, from the litigants’ briefs and from their 
clerks’ memoranda.  
In light of the many nuances that attend any consideration of 
judicial voice, and the ways in which the two dimensions of voice 
overlap, I argue that we should reorient thinking away from an 
“either/or” formulation in which judicial opinion voice is either 
typified and genre-based or reflective of authorial choice to a   
richer conception that embraces “both/and.”  Specifically, I argue 
that we should locate judicial voice in both the attributes of the 
writing and the writer. This argument finds some support in   
Mikhail Bakhtin’s linguistic and literary theory, particularly his 
idea of heteroglossia. Although developed as a theory of novelistic 
discourse, the concept has a more general formulation            
  
 31. E.g., Ray, Judicial Personality, supra note 26, at 226. 
 32. Id. at 195–221. 
 33. For a discussion of the authorship implications of non-publication see Patricia M. 
Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writing, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1371, 1373–77 (1995).   
 34. See, for example, Linda Greenhouse’s discussion of the process of exchange and 
commentary that led to evolution of the draft that became the majority opinions in Roe v. 
Wade and Doe v. Bolton.   LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY 
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 80–101 (2005). 
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highlighting for Bakhtin the nature of language, which “like the 
living concrete environment in which the consciousness of the 
verbal artist lives is never unitary.”35  Rather, “language is      
heteroglot from top to bottom,” in the sense that it consists of 
multiple “forms for conceptualizing the world in words,” forms 
that intersect with and may even contradict one another.36  
This rejection of the idea that language is unitary also has 
implications for the concept of voice. For Bakhtin, words are fluid 
and can be appropriated but, until then, they are “half someone 
else’s,” existing in “other people’s mouths, in other people’s      
contexts, serving other people’s intentions.”37 His references to 
“form”38 and his locating of language in the exchanges between 
people, I will suggest, support an idea of genre-based voice (form) 
and the distinctive interventions of an authorial voice (appropria-
tion). 
Understanding writing in terms of voice shares some ground 
with rhetorical analysis in that a sensibility about voice requires 
attention to rhetorical choices that, in turn, help to illuminate 
both genre-based and authorial voice. However, I argue that    
attending to voice involves an aural dimension beyond a surface 
analysis of rhetoric: it entails noting the way in which a writing 
includes patterns and shifts in language that produce an aural 
effect. This aural dimension includes the tone, rhythms,           
repetitions, emphases, and exaggerations that we can “hear” 
when a court especially presses a point or refutes it, when it seeks 
to disarm it or to shore it up.  Cultivating an ear for how a judicial 
writing is voiced can help us attend to the points in an opinion in 
which the crucial work of analytic reasoning is occurring, or when 
it is breaking down.  As I will attempt to demonstrate, focusing on 
voice involves close analysis of how a writing is pitched, and   
  
 35. MIKHAIL M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 288 (Michael 
Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans. 1981). 
 36. Id. at 291–92. 
 37. Id. at 293–94; see also Rideout, supra note 12, at 87 nn.77–83 (discussing Bakh-
tin’s dialogism, the idea that all use of language involves borrowing and appropriation 
from others’ prior uses). 
 38. Bakhtin’s essay, Discourse in the Novel, seems to link “form” to a mode for “mani-
festing intentions” that is “used to convey meaning.” BAKHTIN, supra note 35, at 289, 290.  
In explicating “genre,” he points to a relationship between genre and form: “Certain fea-
tures of language take on the specific flavor of a given genre: they knit together with spe-
cific points of view, specific approaches, forms of thinking, nuances and accents character-
istic of the given genre.” Id. at 289. 
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modulated, and the ways in which it resonates. Becoming attuned 
to whether a writing’s voice is confident or self-conscious, assured 
or overwrought, understated or strident, allows the audiences of 
judicial opinions to get at something deeper in a writing than its 
surface rhetoric: these variations in voice signal tensions, shifts, 
contradictions, and gaps in doctrinal reasoning. “Listening” for 
these variations offers an analytic resource to the interpretive 
repertoire of law students and their teachers, lawyers, judges, 
other close readers, and judicial authors themselves as they work 
through the writing and analytic process. 
III.   A BROADER CONCEPTION OF WRITING AND WRITER 
IN A JUDICIAL CONTEXT  
Pursuing the question whether there is an identifiable voice 
for judicial writing, in this part, I develop the idea that the inves-
tigation of judicial voice requires analysis not only of writing by 
judicial authors but also writing intended for judges, what I will 
refer to as writing in a judicial context. Typically this expanded 
idea of the kinds of writing we must examine to understand judi-
cial voice begins with a bench memo, in which the writer prepares 
an objective, explanatory analysis of law and legal arguments for 
a judge’s consideration.39 That analysis entails reading and      
digesting the briefs of the parties, which are also written for a 
judge, but for the distinct purpose of advancing a legal argument. 
The variations in writing voice appropriate to each of these     
writings—what we might tentatively refer to as the authoritative 
and justifying voice of the opinion, the assertive voice of the brief, 
and the explanatory voice of the bench memo—reflect functional 
features of each genre rooted in the purpose and audience of these 
writings. At the same time, the fact that these writings share a 
  
 39. Not all judges require bench memos. The late Judge Frank Coffin of the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals preferred the directness of oral exchanges with his clerks, and the 
time savings that that practice entailed. COFFIN, supra note 30, at 196–97. Some members 
of the bench are selective when assigning a full-blown analytic memo. For example, former 
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell calibrated memos in terms of “‘major research mem-
os, full memos, and “bobtail” bench memos’” on the basis of the importance of the legal 
issue involved. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS 
OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 3–4 (2006) (quoting Letter from 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene J. Comey, Tyler A. Baker, Charles C. Ames, and David A. 
Martin (June 3, 1977), in Powell Papers Box 130b)). 
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judicial context and exist in relation to one another suggests link-
ages and intersections in the way they are voiced.   
Moreover, because, as I have suggested, judicial voice impli-
cates not only the conventions of a genre (the writing) but also the 
expressive choices of the author, this part will address as well the 
authorial dimension of voice. Specifically, I suggest that authorial 
voice in judicial opinions is never unitary but actually the product 
of engagement among writers—encompassing judges, judicial 
clerks, and brief writing advocates—speaking to one another.  To 
be sure, the genre-based and authorial aspects of voice shade into 
one another and often will overlap. However, the discussion to 
follow will distinguish between them where useful to highlight 
what each can contribute to an understanding of voice in a        
judicial context.  
A.  The Bench Memo  
1.  Genre-Based Voice 
Drawing on the parties’ arguments, the judicial clerk, unlike 
the brief writer, writes not as an advocate seeking to persuade a 
decision maker, but rather as an employee in a confidential     
professional relationship. The clerk is expected to write in a    
genre-based voice that explains, analyzes, and evaluates law, fact, 
and the parties’ claims and arguments to help a judge prepare for 
oral argument and post-argument conferences with the judge’s 
colleagues on the bench.40 Occurring as it does within the context 
of litigation, the clerk’s writing task is very much grounded in the 
specificities of the parties’ actual arguments and theories of the 
case. 
To do this preparatory work effectively, judicial clerks need to 
internalize the arguments; that is, they must be able to             
paraphrase rather than merely to quote them, and to distill from 
them the most important points. In this genre-based understand-
ing of voice, the bench memo writer needs to step back from the 
brief writers’ characterizations of the law and assess the doctrine 
as well as the arguments fashioned from it, independently, 
screening out the glosses of the advocate. In effect, the bench 
memo writer is tasked with accurately communicating the gist of 
  
 40. See id. at 3, 155. 
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the parties’ arguments without lapsing into an advocacy voice, 
while also assessing the arguments for doctrinal accuracy. Such a 
nuanced writing role calls for a memo-writing voice that is       
focused and focusing, rooted in the function of a bench memo; it 
requires a voice that is confident enough to direct the judicial 
reader’s attention, but sufficiently self-effacing to subordinate 
itself to the theory of argument and the judicial reader’s need for 
a clear exposition of its substance to help prepare for oral         
argument. 
The practice in the United States Supreme Court is for a 
clerk to draft bench memos for the clerk’s individual Justice ra-
ther than to write a memo that is shared by the other chambers41 
(the prevailing practice, by contrast, when the Court reviews   
certiorari petitions).42 That the audience for a bench memo is    
individualized allows the clerk to fashion it in a way that accords 
with the Justice’s intellectual predilections and ways of working. 
Thus, it may encompass a range of discursive styles. But when 
the bench memo is drafted by a relatively junior lawyer lacking 
the Justice’s experience and authority, as is the case in the   
United States Supreme Court, one might expect it to reflect a  
deferential relationship. 
Working from Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun’s      
voluminous personal papers, Linda Greenhouse’s magisterial      
Becoming Justice Blackmun offers a rare glimpse into the        
language of Supreme Court bench memos.  Detailing the           
intellectual process by which Justice Blackmun grappled with the 
issues in Roe v. Wade, including the Justice’s productive    inter-
action with his clerks, Greenhouse quotes from the thirty-nine-
page bench memo prepared for what proved to be the first of two 
arguments in Roe. The text reveals a genre-based voice that is 
measured, and somewhat tentative, which seems consistent with 
the function of the bench memo and the nature of the relationship 
between writer and audience.   
Discussing a Georgia statute that a district court held violat-
ed a pregnant woman’s right to privacy and personal liberty, the 
clerk suggested some doubt about the district court’s approach, 
which he opined was “supportable but difficult to reach because of 
the strong recognition it accords the woman’s right as against 
  
 41. See Rutledge, supra note 29, at 393–94. 
 42. Id. at 385–94. 
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other interests.”43 The memo went on to suggest that “[p]erhaps a 
better way of approaching it is to reason not that the woman’s 
right is so strong but that to permit other criteria in these stat-
utes [other than a doctor’s view of the best course for the patient] 
is in the end to restrict medical judgment about what is best for 
each woman.”44 
In addition to the use of equivocating language (“perhaps”), 
the memo suggests an endorsement of one approach (grounding 
the case in a physician’s interests) over another, arguably weaker 
alternative rather than a full embrace of the seemingly preferred 
ground of decision. It is also steeped in the language of reasoned 
analysis consistent with its genre: one view is “supportable” but 
the preferred course is framed explicitly in terms of reasoning: a 
better way is to “reason not” that one right is strong but to      
predicate the ruling on the need to preserve a doctor’s exercise of 
medical judgment. When Justice Blackmun asked a clerk from a 
later term for an analysis of Justice Powell’s suggestion that the 
right to an abortion should be linked to viability of a fetus rather 
than the end of the first trimester of a pregnancy, the clerk      
responded more definitively, although still with some caution:  
While the trimester is, as you admit, an arbitrary cutoff, I 
don’t think that it is all that arbitrary, and I would not want 
to prejudge a state’s interests during the ‘interim’ period   
between the end of the first trimester and viability at this 
time. I would stand by your original position.”45  
  
 43. GREENHOUSE, supra note 34, at 81. 
 44. Id. at 81–82. Among other things, the Georgia statute required confirmation of a 
doctor’s judgment concerning the necessity of having an abortion by two independent phy-
sicians’ assessments, that the procedure be performed in an accredited hospital, and ap-
proved by a hospital committee, and that the procedure be limited to Georgia residents. Id. 
at 78; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192–200 (1973) (discussing and invalidating 
these provisions). As Linda Greenhouse notes, id. at 99, Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe 
v. Wade makes clear that its rationale was mainly grounded in the right of a physician to 
exercise medical judgment: 
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment 
according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state inter-
ests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abor-
tion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and 
basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.  
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66 (1973). 
 45. GREENHOUSE, supra note 34, at 96. 
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The caution here does not suggest lack of certainty so much 
as a disposition to decide, or to commit to, as little as is necessary 
“at this time” on a legal issue—the extent of a state’s interests in 
protecting a women’s health—that might require further           
delineation. 
2.  Authorial Voice 
In addition to attending to the facts and the issues, in the 
Supreme Court context bench memos may also set out a           
rhetorical presentation of judicial reasoning commensurate with 
clerks’ conception of their judicial employer’s voice. Here, then, 
the idea of authorial voice becomes relevant. A seventy-one-page 
bench memo to Justice Lewis Powell in Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke46 concerning the legality of race-conscious 
admission policies in a state-supported medical school offers some 
evidence of how issues of authorial voice can surface. Justice 
Powell’s clerk sketched out the approach that Justice Powell, who 
would author the main opinion in the case, ultimately adopted. 
Tellingly, the memo began with the moderating observation that 
this author-surrogate sought “to map out a middle ground which 
will avoid the dire consequences each side predicts if it should 
lose.”47 By contrast, when William Rehnquist clerked for Justice 
Robert Jackson and addressed the issue of segregation challenged 
in Brown v. Board of Education,48 his assessment of the state of 
the law on the “separate but equal” doctrine was frank and con-
scious that his understanding diverged from the developing view. 
Rehnquist wrote, “I realize that it is an unpopular and 
unh[u]manitarian position, but I think Plessy v. Ferguson49 was 
right and should be affirmed.”50 
To be sure, the content and tone of these memo excerpts of 
themselves offer limited, if highly specific, evidence of authorial 
voice.  That bench memos are written in the context of a clerk-
judge relationship contemplates that they will convey the         
  
 46. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 47. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 52 (quoting Letter from Robert D. Comfort to 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Aug. 29, 1977), Powell Papers Box 46). 
 48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 49. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 50. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 41 (quoting DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: 
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 161 (2d ed. 1990)). 
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formality and hierarchy inherent in that professional context, and 
here consideration of authorial and genre-based voice intersect. 
However, the voice of a bench memo will also reflect the particu-
larities of the working relationship and the preferences and      
priorities of the judge for whom they are written. The relationship 
may be more or less “egalitarian,” at least in the recollection of 
one Felix Frankfurter clerk,51 but typically the work expectations 
are rigorous,52 in keeping with the invited intellectual exchange. 
Justice O’Connor similarly promoted lawyerly exchanges in her 
chambers. She expected a detailed bench memo on every case that 
was orally argued.53 After a clerk completed the task, the Justice 
would ask her other clerks54 to draft “countermemos” if they did 
not concur with the first clerk’s conclusions.55  
3.  Bench Memos and Opinions 
These examples suggest the complex ways in which bench 
memos can operate in the broader context of judicial writing. If 
the voice of the bench memo is principally rooted in the            
specificities of the bench memo genre, the explanatory and       
analytic functions of that genre have a role to play in the judicial 
opinion as well, placing the two in functional relation to one     
another. The idea of authorial voice is also at issue when a memo-
writing clerk approximates a judicial employer’s rhetorical       
approach, as in the Bakke memo, or when clerk authors are en-
couraged to lay out a position dialogically, vis-a-vis other clerks. 
Recognizing the role that the bench memo can play in developing 
the structure and reasoning of an opinion offers us a more        
nuanced understanding of the idea of voice in a judicial context, 
one that embraces functions of the bench memo as a genre and 
  
 51. Id. at 41 (quoting former Frankfurter clerk Alexander Bickel). 
 52. See, e.g., id. (detailing how Justice Frankfurter claimed to engage with his clerks 
without hierarchy, in a relation in which “no deference to position is permitted, no yessing, 
however much some of them in the beginning be awed”; at the same time, he professed to 
be a “very exacting task-master; no nonsense, intellectually speaking, is tolerated, no 
short-cuts,” suggesting that memos were written in a voice that was nothing if not careful 
and rigorously analytic) (quoting LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL 
BIOGRAPHY 415 (1984)).  
 53. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 
216 (2007). 
 54. Since 1974 each Supreme Court Justice has been afforded four clerks. Id. at 45. 
 55. Id. at 216. 
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the stylistic preferences of clerks and the judges to whom they 
write.56 
B.  The Brief  
Of course, to draft the bench memo, the judicial clerk must 
analyze the persuasiveness of written arguments developed in the 
briefs of the parties (and amici curiae). This entails a close read-
ing and evaluation of the briefs both for the analytic rigor and 
logical persuasiveness of the arguments and for the more distinc-
tive authorial features that “speak” to anticipated readers (struc-
ture, thematic development, choice of language, emphasis and 
extent of reasoning, choice of authority).  Thus, the brief writer’s 
skill in projecting an effective advocacy voice—both genre-based 
and authorial—is a crucial component in reaching and persuading 
the brief’s intended audience and evaluators—the judge and also 
the judge’s clerk. 
1.  Genre-Based Voice 
How do decision makers assess advocacy? In Minding the 
Law, Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner analyze the       
rhetorical situation in which judges evaluate efforts at             
persuasion.  The authors emphasize conventional, genre-based 
features rooted in the function of advocacy that warrant a deci-
sion maker’s wariness, a caution born of a sense that arguments 
are “presumably self-interested” and possibly “custom-
designed.”57  They posit that underlying legal discourse is the idea 
of contestability, that contestability in turn triggers an impulse to 
discredit, which implies that efforts to persuade will seem self-
interested and become suspect.58 If an arbiter, recognizing that 
the function of an argument is to be persuasive, accepts this set of 
assumptions about legal argument, then, ironically, the work of 
an effective advocate may seem particularly suspect.59  
  
 56. It is true the reader of an opinion will not have access to the bench memo and will 
not be in a position to assess the interplay between the memo and the opinion. However, 
the aim here is to bring to light that other writers contribute to the concept of judicial 
voice.   
 57. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 21, at 174. 
 58. Id. at 173–175. 
 59. Id. at 174. This understanding of the premises underlying persuasive argument is 
not necessarily in tension with the idea that good advocacy should demonstrate ethos, or 
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But if wariness rather than an expectation of straightfor-
ward, transparent argument is the dominant mindset of a deci-
sion maker, how can advocates disarm it? Here, Amsterdam and 
Bruner suggest that advocates essentially need to avoid appeals 
that too obviously seem as if they are designed simply to          
persuade; rather, advocates must preserve a degree of              
“deniability.”60 The authors identify rhetorical techniques that are 
“staples of persuasion” because they aim to “conceal . . . contesta-
bility” and overcome the problem of argumentation that too      
obviously seems calculated to persuade:61 Ontological construction 
techniques62 suggest that the advocate’s position is solid and   
substantial; epistemological techniques63 highlight the certainty 
of one’s position or the indeterminacy of the opposing interpreta-
tion; culturally resonant narratives can prompt an arbiter to   
suspend disbelief;64 and prototypes and metaphor can imbue one’s 
language with desired meanings.65   
2.  Authorial Voice 
If these approaches are part of a genre of persuasion, it seems 
fair to conclude that the extent to which they are used              
successfully in advocacy is in part a function of what the individ-
ual writer contributes—authorial framing and rhetorical skill. To 
test how these authorial features might be voiced in advocacy 
writing, the briefs filed in the United States Supreme Court in 
the historic case, National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius,66 are illuminating. The underlying litigation generated 
considerable attention because it addressed the constitutionality 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, known in some 
circles as Obamacare. The Government’s brief in support of the 
  
credibility, and integrity. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 125 
(2013), quoted in Gregory Johnson, Credibility in Advocacy: Humility as the First Step, 39 
VT. B.J. 22, Fall 2013. Here, Amsterdam and Bruner seem most concerned with the inter-
play between an advocate’s and an arbiter’s expectations about how the other understands 
persuasiveness. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 21, at 176. 
 60. Id. at 174–76. An arbiter, Amsterdam and Bruner go so far as to posit, is likely to 
be guided by the principle of caveat emptor. Id. at 174. 
 61. Id. at 175–77. 
 62. Id. at 177–84. 
 63. Id. at 184–86. 
 64. Id. at 186–97. 
 65. Id. at 187–92. 
 66. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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controversial minimum-coverage (individual mandate) provision 
began with a comprehensive statement of the purpose of the Act 
that set out the parameters of the problem: health insurance is 
the principal means for paying for health care services; affordable 
health insurance is not widely available; and many uninsured 
persons participate in the market for health care, resulting in 
shifts in the costs of care to others.67 The brief went on to show 
how the Affordable Care Act (ACA) seeks to remedy the prob-
lem,68 then delved into the many years of failed federal efforts to 
enact comprehensive health care reform, the efforts of states to do 
so, and differences in the states’ reform efforts depending on 
whether the state laws included a minimum-coverage provision 
comparable to that enacted by the federal government.69  
The Supreme Court ultimately sustained the Act using the 
Government’s alternative argument under Congress’ taxing pow-
er.70 But in its principal point of argument, the Government justi-
fied the legislation based mainly on the Commerce Clause and 
drew support as well from the Necessary and Proper Clause.71 
Advancing this rationale, the Government offered two theories of 
argument to show that the minimum-coverage provision regulates 
how people finance health care: (1) the provision was part of a 
broader regulatory scheme governing how consumption of health 
care was financed, and (2) the provision regulates economic con-
duct with a substantial effect on interstate commerce.72  
Two sets of respondents (state and private) filed briefs in    
response. To illustrate the contrast with the Government’s       
approach, this section will focus attention on the State              
Respondents’ brief, which emphasized the following points: the 
text of the Commerce Clause authorizes only regulation of       
interstate     commerce; the minimum-coverage provision was un-
precedented in that it was no mere regulation of commerce but 
rather a mandate that uninsured  people enter commerce; and the 
provision would coerce individuals in disregard of the structural 
  
 67. Brief of Petitioners, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, sub nom. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Services v. Florida, 2012 WL 37168, at *3–8 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-
398) (minimum coverage provision). 
 68. Id. at *9–12. 
 69. Id. at *12–16. 
 70. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594–2600. 
 71. Brief of Petitioners, 2012 WL 37168, at *17–20 (summary of argument). 
 72. Id. at *17–19 (summary of argument). 
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limits of the Constitution that reserve exercise of police power to 
states. The opening of the Summary of Argument captured this 
idea: 
     The individual mandate is an unprecedented law that 
rests on an extraordinary and unbounded assertion of      
federal power. Under any faithful reading of the              
Constitution’s enumeration of limited federal powers, the 
mandate cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. 
     The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate 
commerce, not the power to compel individuals to enter into 
commerce. That distinction is fundamental.73  
As legal writing authority Ross Guberman74 has observed, the 
Government’s brief effectively used choices about rhetorical fram-
ing and emphasis—aspects of authorial voice—to demonstrate 
through statistics and economically-based argument that a health 
care crisis existed. It also scored points in Guberman’s assess-
ment for including citations both to a conservative-leaning judge 
who voted to uphold the ACA in the lower courts and to Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment in Gonzalez v. Raich,75 
which took an expansive view of Congress’ Commerce Clause au-
thority when augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Yet 
what the Government’s brief lacked, Guberman opined, was a 
counter-theme to the State Respondents’ “unprecedented and un-
bounded power” theme, which it wove into every part of its brief. 
The State Respondents’ brief had an effective authorial voice in-
cluding a “crisp” narrative and clear-cut examples to illustrate the 
implications of allowing the federal government to require the 
purchase of minimum health insurance coverage.76  
  
 73. Brief of State Respondents, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, sub nom. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Services v. Florida, 2012 WL 392550, at *10–11 (U.S. Feb. 6, 
2012) (No. 11-398) (minimum coverage provision) (emphasis in original); see also id. at *17 
(“The power to regulate … ongoing commercial intercourse is precisely what the framers 
intended to confer. The power to force individuals to engage in commercial transactions 
against their will was the kind of police power that they reserved to state governments 
more directly accountable to the people (or ‘applicable individuals,’ as the ACA would have 
it).”). 
 74. Ross Guberman heads a consulting and training firm for advanced legal writing, is 
a Professorial Lecturer in Law at The George Washington University Law School, and the 
author of POINT MADE: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE NATION’S TOP ADVOCATES (2d ed. 2014). 
 75. 545 U.S. 1, 33–42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 76. Ross Guberman critiques the Government’s health care brief,  
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If we apply Amsterdam and Bruner’s rhetorical framework, 
the State Respondents’ brief tapped into a culturally resonant 
narrative about federal government overreach and threats to 
cherished individual autonomy—“A power to compel individuals 
to enter into commerce would amount to a plenary power to com-
pel individuals to live their day-to-day lives according to         
Congress’ dictates.”77 It presented its theme that the legislation 
constituted an unprecedented and unbounded application of fed-
eral power with a level of confidence approaching epistemological 
certainty—“The power that the federal government asserts is as 
unbounded as it is unprecedented. Indeed, the federal govern-
ment’s effort to liken the Affordable Care Act to more familiar 
legislation only succeeds in highlighting the complete absence of 
any limiting principle for the power asserted.”78   The brief offered 
concrete examples showing that the Government’s interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause power underpinning the legislation had 
no limiting principles—for example, under the Government’s 
view, the Commerce Clause power could easily be applied to    
require the purchase of a car. The brief’s use of examples offered 
rhetorical solidity as against the Government’s more economic 
data-driven and less tangible explanations—“There is no         
principled reason why the asserted power to compel individuals to 
purchase insurance could not be exercised to compel individuals 
to purchase cars.”79   In short, the State Respondents’ more artful 
and effective authorial choices in its Commerce Clause argu-
ment—their rhetorical framing, thematic repetition, and diction—
led to a clear and resonant advocacy voice.  
3.  Briefs and Opinions: Echoes of the Advocate’s Voice 
Like bench memos, advocacy briefs are an integral part of the 
rhetorical situation in which judges write. As noted, the voice of a 
brief is partly rooted in genre-based attributes linked to the need 
to make persuasive argument seem less obviously so and less   




 77. Brief of State Respondents, 2012 WL 392550, at *37. 
 78. Id. at *24. 
 79. Id. at *7. 
 80. See supra notes 57–65 and accompanying text. 
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effectiveness in concealing contestability and dispelling suspicion 
of self-interestedness is tied to an author’s rhetorical skill.81 These 
two aspects of voice in advocacy briefs are closely intertwined. 
The success with which a brief overcomes these challenges to   
persuasiveness will increase the likelihood that it will actually 
persuade and perhaps influence the structure and reasoning of an 
opinion.  
To demonstrate, I return to the discussion of National      
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius begun in section 
III(B)(2) to illustrate how judicial opinions internalize the rhetoric 
and framing of advocacy directed to them.  In the Supreme 
Court’s recent ruling, both Chief Justice Roberts’ main opinion 
and the opinion of the quartet of dissenters (Justices Scalia,   
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) bear the traces of the State         
Respondents’ rhetorical framing.  
For example, taking up the Commerce Clause argument, the 
Chief Justice opined that “Congress has never attempted to rely 
on [the commerce] power to compel individuals not engaged in 
commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”82  Drawing on the 
Respondents’ theme of lack of precedent for a legislative purchas-
ing mandate, the opinion quoted from a case referring to the “lack 
of historical precedent”83 and made the case for careful considera-
tion of legislation that entailed a “new conception[ ] of federal 
power.”84 Opining that both the language of the Constitution and 
Commerce Clause precedent “reflect[ ] the natural understanding 
that the power to regulate assumes there is already something to 
be regulated”85 and that the minimum-coverage (individual man-
date) provision “compels individuals to become active in commerce 
by purchasing a product,”86 the opinion again takes up the idea of 
novelty and lack of precedent: “Construing the Commerce Clause 
to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they 
are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain 
to congressional activity.”87  
  
 81. See supra notes 66–79 and accompanying text. 
 82. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2586. 
 83. Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3159 (2010)). 
 84. 132 S. Ct. at 2568.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2587 (emphasis in original). 
 87. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Moving to the Government’s argument under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, the opinion reinforced both the idea that regu-
lation presupposes the existence of something to regulate (the 
individual mandate ”vests Congress with the extraordinary      
ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an        
enumerated power”)88 and that the mandate exceeds the        
structural limits of the Constitution on federal power (“[b]ut we 
have also carried out our responsibility to declare                      
unconstitutional those laws that undermine the structure of    
government established by the Constitution”).89 
The jointly written dissent also echoed the State                 
Respondents’ brief in emphasizing structural limits, the lack of 
precedent for, and the extraordinary reach of, the minimum-
coverage provision: the ”unprecedented”90 individual mandate 
expands federal power into a “broad new field” that is “limitless”; 
“further.”91  Further, “if every person comes within the Commerce 
Clause power of Congress to regulate by the simple reason that he 
will one day engage in commerce, the idea of a limited             
Government power is at an end.”92 
In short, although neither the main opinion nor the joint   
dissent cited the State Respondents’ brief directly in their discus-
sion of the individual mandate, each of the opinions resonated 
with its rhetoric and ideas: as an unprecedented assertion of fed-
eral power, the mandate was extraordinary and thus an unconsti-
tutional exercise of legislative authority.  The frequent repetition 
of that idea in the brief, and appeal to Justices inclined to limit 
rather than expand federal power, demonstrate how an advocacy 
voice can find expression in the rhetorical context of the opinion: 
judicial opinion voice can internalize the persuasive framing of 
the advocate and, in the Bakhtinian sense, plausibly be “half 
someone else’s.”93 
  
 88. Id. at 2592. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 93. See BAKHTIN, supra note 35, at 293–94; Rideout, supra note 12, at 87 nn.77–83 
(discussing Bakhtin’s dialogism, the idea that all use of language involves borrowing and 
appropriation from others’ prior uses); supra text accompanying note 37.   
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C.  The Opinion 
The judicial opinion is the culmination of the rhetorical         
efforts of the bench memo, the briefs, and the oral argument. 
Whether written by the judge, the judicial clerk, or in some col-
laborative arrangement between the two, the opinion, as a genre, 
not only announces an outcome but also elaborates the ra-
tionale—doctrinally based, fact-, or policy-driven—that supports 
it.94 This genre-based voice of the opinion is thus at once           
authoritative, directing a disposition that binds the parties, and 
justifying, in that it sets out its reasons for ruling in the way that 
it has.95  But upon deeper analysis of opinions, it would be mis-
guided to conceive of the opinion’s genre-based voice as unitary: 
although the dispositional and justifying functions of an opinion 
give it a fairly consistent and identifiable genre-based voice, as 
noted, the judicial opinion also incorporates functions of the bench 
memo and advocate’s brief genres.96 Moreover, the authorial voice 
of the opinion is itself a complex phenomenon to which the       
authors of other judicially oriented writings contribute.97 
1.   Voice in the Main Opinion 
a.  Genre-based voice 
John Leubsdorf’s catalogue of the attributes of a judicial   
opinion highlight how an opinion subsumes the functions of other 
legal and even literary genres: 
An opinion works in differing but related ways. Like a novel, 
it portrays a human conflict. Like a letter, it intervenes in 
the conflict it portrays. Like a treatise, it gives a systematic 
analysis meant to be applicable to many situations. Like a 
work of history or criticism, it compares disputes that have 
occurred over the years and analyzes what past authors 
have proposed. Like a dialogue, it embraces clashing ap-
proaches to the conflict before the court. Like a script or 
  
 94. See Wald, supra note 33, at 1374–77; see generally James Boyd White, Judicial 
Opinion Writing— What’s an Opinion for?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995). 
 95. See Ferguson, supra note 20, at 210–16. 
 96. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 21, at 166–67, 176, 216. 
 97. See supra notes 35–37. 
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computer program, it gives instructions to those who act and 
decide. Like an oration, it seeks to persuade.98 
If the genre-based voice of the judicial opinion incorporates 
these multiple functions, the authorial voice, particularly in an 
opinion issued by a multimember appellate court, similarly is not 
singular. The very process of circulating and considering opinion 
drafts among judges and clerks in chambers, in addition to the 
influence of briefs and lower court opinions in the case, ensures 
that multiple voices and perspectives are likely to inflect the final 
product.99 The following discussion addresses this authorial     
aspect of judicial opinion voice. 
b.  Multiplicity of Authorial Voice 
Variations in rhetorical approach among judicial authors, 
whether they write individually or, less commonly, in collabora-
tion, will inflect the authorial dimension of voice of a main opin-
ion. A majority or plurality opinion by Justice Scalia resonates 
differently from one written by Justice Breyer or Justice       
Ginsburg, even when the contributions of judicial clerks to these 
opinions are accounted for. As Justice Breyer himself has noted, 
his approach to writing is quite distinct from that of Justice    
Scalia.  Justice Breyer avers that “[i]n writing, one must under-
state,” because overstatement, while often effective rhetorically in 
conversation, would lend itself to being misunderstood in         
writing.100 Nonetheless, he “respect[s] other writing styles that 
are different, yet effective,” singling out Justice Scalia’s “dramatic 
approach.”101  
Still, an authoring Justice often will need to adjust an opin-
ion’s breadth of language and statement of rationale, and possibly 
other attributes that mark authorial voice, in an effort to gain the 
support of a Court majority.102   In this sense the main opinion will 
  
 98. Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 447. 
 99. See Jeannie Suk, Taking the Home, 20 LAW & LIT. 291, 293 (2008); see also 
Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 491–94 (discussing the range of voices that may inhabit an 
opinion, including those of dissenters and lower court opinion authors, arguments of coun-
sel, the parties, and witnesses).  
 100. YAGODA, supra note 7, at 170 (quoting Justice Breyer). 
 101. Id. at 171. 
 102. Ward, supra note 33, at 1377–80. It is in this sense that the named author speaks 
as well for the Court that John Leubsdorf refers to appellate opinions as “double-voiced.” 
Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 488–90. 
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normally be responsive to, or at least cognizant of, other authorial 
voices on the Court. The less common jointly authored opinion 
must negotiate differences in individual authorial voice even more 
directly.  In the case of multiple judicial authors, one might ask 
whether it is possible to harmonize authorial voice in the face of 
varying emphases and rhetorical choices among co-authors.    
The reproductive rights case, Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,103 offers some insight into the na-
ture of authorial presence in a jointly authored opinion. In Casey, 
the members of the heavily fractured Court produced five       
opinions. The main opinion, jointly authored by Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, struck down a spousal            
notification provision in, but otherwise upheld, a Pennsylvania 
statute that restricted access to abortion. Equally significant, this 
opinion sought to reestablish the precedential vitality of Roe v. 
Wade104 countering earlier post-Roe decisions that had “chipped . . 
. away” at it.105    
Apart from the symbolic importance of the use of the joint 
opinion form in this case,106 the implications for authorial voice 
were interesting. The main opinion in Casey did not signal how 
the authors divided the actual writing work, but extrajudicial  
evidence indicates that all three Justices participated in drafting 
it.107 Justice Kennedy, whose position in prior cases suggested 
that he had reservations with respect to aspects of Roe’s holding, 
apparently wrote the opening part affirming the continued       
validity of Roe.108 When the Justices read portions of the opinion 
from the bench, Justice Kennedy linked himself to another part of 
  
 103. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 105. See Mary Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern 
Pro-Life Feminism, 28 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 232, 254 n.157 (2013) (noting that the 
Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), “had chipped the 
most away at” Roe). 
 106. See Ray, Judging the Justices, supra note 28, at 219–20. For a more recent analy-
sis of the use of the jointly authored opinion in Casey as an example of “strategic collabora-
tion” and “common ground” though not “perfect agreement,” see Laura Krugman Ray, 
Circumstance and Strategy: Jointly Authored Supreme Court Opinions, 12 NEV. L.J. 727, 
767–81 (2012) [hereinafter Circumstance and Strategy]. 
 107. TOOBIN, supra note 53, at 54.  In his Notes at the conclusion of The Nine, Jeffrey 
Toobin states that his principal sources were “not-for-attribution” interviews with Justices 
and more than seventy-five of their law clerks. Id. at 342.  Toobin notes that the section on 
Casey was informed by Justice Blackmun’s papers in the Library of Congress. Id. 
 108. Id. at 54; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–46. 
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the opinion text addressing the philosophical conception of liberty 
and deep conundrums of existence: “at the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one’s own concept of existing, of meaning, of the 
universe and of the mystery of human life.”109   
Justice Souter was particularly concerned about addressing 
stare decisis principles and contributed that portion of the opinion 
(part III), a carefully elaborated discussion of the circumstances 
dictating adherence to precedent.110 Justice O’Connor took        
responsibility for discussing the constitutional infirmities of the 
spousal notification provision.111  Part IV of the opinion, although 
not supported by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, who joined in 
the opinion’s first three parts, also laid out a rationale for adopt-
ing an “undue burden” standard, one that Justice O’Connor had 
long favored, in place of the three-trimester framework in Roe.112 
It was her “pragmatic rhetoric,”—her voice— O’Connor biog-
rapher Joan Biskupic has argued, that resounded in the opin-
ion.113 
2.  The Separate Voice: Concurrences and Dissents 
a.  Genre-Based Voice 
If main opinion writers inevitably engage with multiple      
authorial voices, commentators typically identify the voice of the 
separate opinion, whether uttered as a nuanced concurrence, or in 
outright dissent from the majority result and rationale, as       
distinctly resonant.114 However, this section argues that even 
these writings reflect a dimension of multiplicity of voice, and 
here, the distinctions between the genre-based and authorial 
voice similarly are not airtight.   
Concurrences can serve a variety of functions, from           
emphasizing a point made in the majority opinion, to limiting the 
  
 109. JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME 
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 110. BISKUPIC, supra note 109, at 272; TOOBIN, supra note 53, at 54; see also Casey, 505 
U.S. at 854–69. 
 111. TOOBIN, supra note 53, at 54; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 888–98. 
 112. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–79. 
 113. BISKUPIC, supra note 109, at 272. 
 114. Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, I Beg to Differ: Interdisciplinary Ques-
tions About Law, Language and Dissent, in LAW, MYSTERY & THE HUMANITIES: COLLECTED 
ESSAYS 141–45, 148, 151–54 (Logan Atkinson & Diana Majury eds., 2008). 
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opinion’s reach, to expanding its scope by pointing to other       
possible applications, and to positing an alternative legal         
rationale for the majority opinion—in effect, a concurrence in the 
judgment only.115 Although a characteristic of the concurrence is 
that it presents an “internal commentary” on the Court’s ruling 
that weakens the authority of the main opinion,116 its voice in a 
genre-based sense will vary to some extent according to its      
function.117 
A more pointed separate writing is that of the dissent. Justice 
Brennan, over time an estimable dissenter on the Court,          
addressed the function of dissents, arguing that “[d]issents con-
tribute to the integrity of the [judicial] process, not only by direct-
ing attention to perceived difficulties with the majority’s opinion 
but . . . also by contributing to the marketplace of competing     
ideas.”118  In the sense that a dissent can “sow seeds for future 
harvest,” the dissent is forward-looking and keeps open the possi-
bility that the Court in a future opinion will adopt that dissent’s 
line of reasoning.119  As Marie-Claire Belleau and Rebecca John-
son emphasize in their elaboration on the rhetorical impact of dis-
sents, Justice Brennan’s seed-sowing dissents, as he puts it, “‘soar 
with passion and ring with rhetoric.’”120 The function of dissents 
of this sort, Belleau and Johnson argue, is to engage “noetic 
space,” a term they borrow from Amsterdam and Bruner in   
Minding the Law that integrates the rational and the emotional. 
It is the space of the imagination that can envision an alternative 
way of interpreting or applying the law.121  
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b.   Authorial Voice 
Even if the dissent as a genre, or sub-genre, given its function 
to differ pointedly, offers a more distinct genre-based voice than a 
concurrence, both forms of separate opinion may still implicate 
multiple authorial voices. First, as in main opinions, other       
Justices often join in a separate opinion; thus, the same issues of 
negotiation exist about language and rationale that main opinion 
writers face. Moreover, the concurring or dissenting voice is never 
uttered in a vacuum but rather is heard in dialogue with the main 
opinion to which it responds.122 These disparate authors’ voices 
are linked precisely because they contest or challenge one        
another.  
The pointed dialogue between Justice Scalia and Justice 
Brennan in dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,123 illustrates the 
way in which a dissenting voice resounds in a main opinion, there 
a plurality joined in fully by only one other Justice. At issue in the 
case was the effort of an unmarried biological father to assert a 
liberty-based parental relationship with his daughter, who was 
conceived and born while her mother was married to and living 
with another man. The plurality concluded that under these     
circumstances Michael H., the biological father, had neither a 
procedural nor a substantive due process interest in pursuing a 
relationship with his daughter.124  To justify this conclusion, the 
plurality applied an interpretive approach that sought to identify 
a specific tradition in case law allowing the assertion of a parental 
interest against the claims of the husband of the child’s mother, 
that is, when the presumption of legitimacy would otherwise pre-
vail.125     
An unusually long footnote by Justice Scalia and sections of 
Justice Brennan’s responsive dissent operate contrapuntally to 
underline crucial differences in interpretive methodology. Specifi-
cally, Justice Brennan’s dissent took issue with Justice Scalia’s 
search for a tradition in the law recognizing the due process 
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rights of, in his words, an ”adulterous natural father” to pursue a 
relationship with his child over the opposition of the child’s   
mother who was married to another man at the time of the child’s 
conception and who, with her husband, wished to raise the child. 
Justice Brennan opined, 
In construing the Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter 
only to those interests specifically protected by historical 
practice . . . the plurality ignores the kind of society in which 
our Constitution exists. We are not an assimilative, homoge-
neous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we 
must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or even 
repellent practice because the same tolerant impulse pro-
tects our own idiosyncrasies. Even if we agree, therefore, 
that “family “ and “parenthood” are part of the good life, it is 
absurd to assume that we can agree on the content of these 
terms and destructive to pretend that we do. In a community 
such as ours, “liberty” must include the freedom not to con-
form. The plurality today squashes this freedom by requiring 
specific approval from history before protecting anything in 
the name of liberty.126 
In specific refutation of this critique, in footnote six127 Justice 
Scalia defended his interpretive method at length: 
The need, if arbitrary decision making is to be avoided, to 
adopt the most specific tradition as the point of reference—
or at least to announce, as Justice Brennan declines to do, 
some other criterion for selecting among the innumerable 
relevant traditions that could be consulted—is well enough 
exemplified by the fact that in the present case Justice 
Brennan’s opinion and Justice O’Connor’s opinion  . . . which 
disapproves this footnote, both appeal to tradition, but on 
the basis of the tradition they select reach opposite results. 
Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving 
judges free to decide as they think best when the unantici-
pated occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by 
any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at 
all.128 
  
 126. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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 128. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.  
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Here, the Justices directly and dialogically engaged one     
another’s views of how to determine the relevant category for as-
sessing the existence of a tradition to define a liberty-based      
parental interest.129 Whereas Justice Scalia favored “the most 
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying 
protection to, the asserted right can be identified,”130 Justice 
Brennan preferred to “ask whether the specific parent-child     
relationship under consideration is close enough to the interests 
that [the Court] already  . . . protected to be deemed an aspect of 
‘liberty’ as well.”131 The ensemble of writings that make up the 
opinion in the case is inflected by that dialogue and direct contes-
tation,132 as well as by the larger conversation among the other 
Justices in the four separate opinions. 
To invoke Bakhtin, the existence of dissents such as Justice 
Brennan’s in Michael H. makes more likely that the main      
opinion’s authorial voice will engage with another’s rhetoric and 
ideas, even when to do so addresses, exposes, and possibly even 
reinforces “other  . . . intentions.”133  
IV.  APPLICATION: VOICE AS INDEX OF DEEPER 
STRUCTURES OF MEANING  
Building on the framework for analyzing judicial opinion 
voice developed in part III, this part uses variations in voice as an 
entry point for a deeper analysis of judicial reasoning in three 
cases.  In these discussions, I point both to (1) shifts in authorial 
voice, that is, variations in authors’ expressive approaches, as 
suggested in Casey, and (2) departures from genre-based voice, for 
example, where, as in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the plurality     
departs from an opinion’s dispositional and justifying functions in 
favor of argumentation, as openings to consider more closely these 
opinions’ analytic coherence. Nonetheless, it bears emphasis that 
variations in genre-based and authorial opinion voice are often 
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connected, and difficult to disentangle, as suggested in discussing 
the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore.  
A.  Casey 
Here, the Article returns to Casey to trace the complex shifts 
in reasoning that, I argue, are signaled by shifts in expression 
and rhetorical framing. As noted, the deeply divided Casey      
opinion comprised a main opinion and four separate writings con-
curring in part in the opinion or in the judgment and dissenting 
in part. The result was a patchwork quilt of judicial writing     
requiring a chart to keep track of the rationales stated in each 
opinion and to confirm which portions of the main opinion       
garnered five votes to constitute the ruling of the Court.  But 
quite apart from the complexity resulting from the variations in 
views in the ensemble of opinions, the main opinion itself is note-
worthy, and rhetorically complex, for having multiple Justices as 
signing judicial authors.  
The complexity of the main opinion in Casey (parts one, two, 
and three), with its shifts in rhetoric and reasoning, seems as 
much bound up in the multiplicity of authors and their concerns 
and perspectives as in its subject matter. Part One begins with a 
ringing sentence that encapsulates the aim of the opinion to shore 
up the jurisprudential standing of Roe, which recognized a wom-
en’s liberty-based right under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause to terminate a pregnancy in its early stages:   
“Liberty has no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”134 Following 
that pronouncement is a short discussion of post-Roe history     
indicating the degree to which the import of its holding had been 
placed in doubt, then a statement “with clarity” of the three parts 
of Roe’s “essential holding,” which the opinion reaffirmed:     
women’s right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability; 
the state’s power to limit abortions after viability; the state’s   
interest from the beginning of pregnancy in protecting the health 
of a pregnant woman and the life of the fetus.135  
Part two of Casey reviews the liberty jurisprudence of which 
Roe is a part and, despite its previous effort at clarity, the Court 
here highlights the complexity of this body of law: “The             
  
 134. 531 U.S. at 844. 
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inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process 
claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to 
exercise the same capacity which by tradition courts always have 
exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible 
of expression as a simple rule.”136 As the opinion attempts to con-
vey that decision making in this area can be challenging, even the 
opinion’s syntax is confounding. (What boundaries are being    
referred to? Reasoned judgment? The adjudication of substantive 
due process claims?) This section goes on to address the moral 
profundities of abortion, and the opinion’s voice takes on a      
character that reflects a more philosophical cast of mind:  
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education.  . . These matters 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right 
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about 
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under the compulsion of the state.137 
But the opinion no sooner takes this philosophic turn that it 
hastens to assure the reader that its focus is rooted in practical 
concerns: abortion is no mere “philosophic exercise. Abortion is a 
unique act . . . fraught with consequences for others.”138 This   
segment of the opinion suggests some familiarity or at least     
empathy with the physical and emotional strains of pregnancy 
but does so in a more detached voice that projects a generic    
woman (“the woman”) and keeps the particular at a distance: 
“The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on 
her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in 
society.”139 
Part three of the opinion shifts to the doctrine of stare decisis, 
and here, in the most jurisprudential portion of the opinion, it 
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develops an extended analysis of that doctrine and its applica-
tions. It takes on an explanatory voice as it elaborates standards 
(whether the decision has proved unworkable, whether it has in-
duced reliance such that overruling would cause social harm, 
whether it is doctrinally anachronistic, and whether its underly-
ing factual premises have changed)140 by which to assess whether 
a precedent merits overruling. It applies those standards to Roe 
and concludes that the rule in Roe still justifies adherence.141 
Then it illustrates how the overturning of two other lines of cases 
(Lochner v. New York142 and Plessy v. Ferguson143) linked to     
national controversies that the cases themselves became part of, 
was consistent with these standards.144  
Although the opinion remains largely faithful to the conven-
tions of its genre, the joint drafting complicates its authorial 
voice; the opinion shifts complexly from speaking with clarity to 
voicing the complexity of liberty jurisprudence, from addressing 
the moral implications of the decision to abort to focusing on the 
practical and material, then back again to the philosophical,    
before turning to the jurisprudential. This last section of the main 
opinion that commands a majority concludes with a discussion of 
the nature and source of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy. Here, 
the opinion refers to voice more directly: 
The Court must take care to speak and act in a way that al-
lows people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court 
claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as com-
promises with social and political pressures having, as such, 
no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged 
to make.145 
In the analysis of legitimacy, the joint opinion suggests that 
judicial voice is concerned with the content of the opinion as much 
as with its expression: even as it struggles to achieve clarity and 
precision, the Court must speak in a way that assures its          
audiences that its reasoning is based on legal principle. It is    
perhaps in this concern, this effort to reframe voice to mean the 
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Court’s speaking as an institution in a principled way, that the 
joint opinion partly overcomes the unevenness in register         
occasioned by differences in individual authorial voice, aspiration, 
and emphasis. 
B.  Michael H. v. Gerald D. 
This section looks again at the plurality in Michael H. v.    
Gerald D. and connects the instability of that opinion’s due pro-
cess rationale with a heightened emphasis conveyed in its        
repeated resort to italicized statements. The highly fractured 
Court that decided Michael H. was, as noted, deeply divided about 
the proper approach to identifying whether a tradition existed for 
recognizing a liberty interest in an unmarried biological father’s 
pursuit of a paternal relationship with a married woman’s child 
when a state law created a presumption that the mother’s hus-
band was the child’s legitimate parent.146 Justice Brennan’s dis-
sent highlighted most trenchantly a sharp difference in approach 
with that of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion. Notably, in the in-
sistence and assertiveness of the plurality’s vocal inflections, an 
advocacy voice seemed to drown out the opinion voice. Here, the 
departure from genre–based voice raised questions about the   
assumptions that underlay the opinion’s reasoning. 
Part three of the opinion determined that, in the face of a 
state presumption of legitimacy, Michael H. had neither a       
procedural right to establish at a hearing his paternity of a child 
who was conceived and born while her mother was married and 
living with her husband, nor a substantive due process right to 
pursue a relationship with the child. Near the beginning of part 
three, the plurality addressed the state courts’ denial of Michael 
H.’s efforts to demonstrate paternity. The plurality’s description 
of the basis for Michael H.’s application assumed that allowing 
Michael H. to establish paternity would have a particular        
consequence:  
We address first the claims of Michael. At the outset, it is 
necessary to clarify what he sought and what he was denied. 
California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual 
fatherhood. Michael was seeking to be declared the father of 
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Victoria. The immediate benefit he evidently sought to      
obtain from that status was visitation rights.  But if Michael 
were successful in being declared the father, other rights 
would follow—most importantly, the right to be considered 
as the parent who should have custody.147 
Here, the plurality’s use of italics for emphasis voiced the 
anxiety fueling the assumption that, if successful in establishing 
paternity, Michael, an adulterous father, would seek custody of 
Victoria and that a judicial declaration of paternity would accord 
him exclusive parental rights vis-à-vis Gerald, the marital father. 
In this view, the procedure of declaring Michael’s paternity was 
inextricably linked to, and would result in, the marital father’s 
loss of substantive paternal rights. 
Later, after concluding that no specific tradition existed in 
the law granting a biological father paternal rights over a child 
born while her mother was married to another man, the plurality 
confusingly seemed to disaggregate the very proceedings that it 
had previously linked together. It asserted that even if the law 
permitted one circumstanced as Michael to seek to overcome the 
state’s presumption of legitimacy, it would be of no legal value 
because the real claim in issue is not a declaration of paternity 
but “substantive” parental rights. To make this point the opinion 
emphasized the distinctness of the two claims: 
Moreover, even if it were clear that one in Michael’s position 
generally possesses, and has generally always possessed, 
standing to challenge the marital child’s legitimacy, that 
would still not establish Michael’s case. As noted earlier, 
what is at issue here is not entitlement to a state             
pronouncement that Victoria was begotten by Michael. It is 
no conceivable denial of constitutional right for a State to 
decline to declare facts unless some legal consequence hinges 
upon the requested declaration.148  
On first reading, the plurality’s shifting locutions appeared to 
contradict its earlier assertion that seeking a declaration of     
paternity is highly consequential. Instead, the plurality simply 
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exaggerated the distinctness between the two proceedings to set 
up what it considered to be the inevitable point of challenging the 
presumption of legitimacy:  
What Michael asserts here is a right to have himself de-
clared the natural father and thereby to obtain parental pre-
rogatives . . . . What he must establish, therefore, is not that 
our society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his 
circumstances to establish paternity but that it has tradi-
tionally accorded such a father parental rights, or at least 
has not traditionally denied them. Even if the law in all 
States had always been that the entire world could challenge 
the marital presumption and obtain a declaration as to who 
was the natural father, that would not advance Michael’s 
claim.149 
Again, the plurality italicized what in its view was the only 
reason to seek a declaration of paternity: to pursue parental 
rights. In fact, the plurality had actually come full circle, taking 
an oblique turn to trumpet its concerns that a marital father risks 
losing all parental rights were a biological father to succeed in 
establishing paternity: 
Here, to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is 
to deny protection to a marital father, and vice versa. If Mi-
chael has a “freedom not to conform”150 (whatever that 
means), Gerald must equivalently have a “freedom to con-
form.” One of them will pay a price for asserting that “free-
dom”—Michael by being unable to act as father of the child 
he has adulterously begotten, or Gerald by being unable to 
preserve the integrity of the traditional family unit he and 
Victoria have established.151 
The plurality’s continued italicizing of its argument—the   
visual sign of stridence in its decisional voice—underscored the 
underlying instability of its interpretive approach. To sustain its 
rationale, the plurality would need to demonstrate that the       
paternal interests of Gerald and Michael could only be understood 
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as the California statute apparently considered them, in the    
nature of a zero sum game, and could not otherwise be              
accommodated in the law. Moreover, the plurality emphasized the 
weightiness of the outcome by placing a weight on the scale:   
characterizing Michael’s act as adulterous, whereas Gerald was 
concerned with “preserv[ing] the integrity of the traditional     
family unit,” assumed that the two men were not morally equiva-
lent, and thus that an outcome awarding Michael paternal rights 
would be against “nature,” in the sense that the state’s             
presumption in favor of the marital father’s rights was part of the 
natural order of things.  
However, nothing in the case supported the conclusion that 
Michael sought to displace Gerald as the head of household, or 
that the recognition of Michael’s paternity would lead to his actu-
ally seeking custodial rights or guarantee any success in his seek-
ing visitation with Victoria. As Justice Brennan’s dissent pointed 
out, the reasoning at the core of the plurality opinion was flawed:  
The plurality’s confusion about the proper analysis of claims 
involving procedural due process also becomes obvious when 
one examines the plurality’s shift in emphasis from the     
putative father’s standing to his ability to obtain parental 
prerogatives.  In announcing that what matters is not the  
father’s ability to claim paternity, but his ability to obtain 
“substantive parental rights”, the plurality turns procedural 
due process upside down. Michael’s challenge in this Court 
does not depend on his ability ultimately to obtain visitation 
rights; it would be strange indeed if, before one could be 
granted a hearing, one were required to prove that one 
would prevail on the merits. The point of procedural due 
process is to give the litigant a fair chance at prevailing, not 
to ensure a particular substantive outcome.152 
What the plurality had strained to yoke together, the clarity 
and directness of Justice Brennan’s dissenting voice exposed as 
separable. The plurality’s reading of the facts, and assertions 
about the consequences of granting Michael a paternity hearing, 
amounted to argumentation rather than analysis. In a pointed 
footnote, the plurality responds to Justice Brennan’s analysis, 
observing that Michael’s petition “does not depend upon his    
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ability ultimately to obtain [substantive parental] rights, but it 
surely depends upon his asserting a claim to those rights, which 
is precisely what Justice BRENNAN denies.”153  But like a    
trumpet’s blare, this rejoinder sounded with the hyper-confidence 
of false bravado. Justice Brennan did not deny that Michael 
would assert some right to pursue a parental relationship, but 
sought to highlight that recognition of a procedural right         
necessarily preceded any effort to pursue a substantive right. In 
thus explaining the “point of procedural due process,” the credible 
voice of Justice Brennan’s dissent is matter-of-fact, cogent, and 
comparatively muted, in contrast to the sense of urgency that we 
hear in the plurality opinion.  
The plurality elided the distinction between procedural and 
substantive due process while assuming an either-or categoriza-
tion of potential paternal interests. Drawing on insistent         
repetitions and assertions, the plurality diverged from the genre-
based functions of an opinion. Instead, its characterizations and 
categorizations assumed functions that more closely                  
approximated advocacy. The plurality’s departure from genre-
based voice, that is, the way in which the plurality sounds, and 
functions, like an argument, helps draw our aural attention to its 
resort to unwarranted assumptions and instances of strained   
reasoning. 
C.  Bush v. Gore  
This section addresses the discordance of the per curiam 
opinion of Bush v. Gore,154 an opinion putatively written as an 
expression of institutional voice, to demonstrate the ruptures in 
reasoning at its core. If a jointly authored opinion as in Casey   
presents challenges to rhetorical coherence and consistency in 
authorial voice, one might think that the per curiam opinion, 
which ostensibly represents the institutional voice, would conquer 
the shifts and variations in voice that are seemingly attributable 
to multiple authors. Yet the implications for authorial voice are 
once again complex if the Court’s resort to the mechanism of the 
per curiam actually reflects the absence of consensus in judicial 
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rationale,155 as it did in Bush v. Gore.156 There, the Court held that 
the divergent ballot counting standards applied in various Florida 
counties during the 2000 Presidential election presented an equal 
protection issue. Another example of a divided Court, Bush v. 
Gore actually consisted of six opinions: in addition to the per curi-
am, the ruling included a concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, and dissents authored by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.157 Quite apart 
from the differences among these separate opinions, the discord-
ance within the main per curiam opinion is itself striking. Tracing 
the opinion’s fluctuations in genre-based and authorial voice 
helps to illuminate its self-contradictory turns. 
First, the Court claimed a novel equal protection basis for   
reversing the Florida Supreme Court, rooted in the “manner” by 
which the right to vote is exercised: 
The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the  
decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the 
minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters 
necessary to secure the fundamental right. Florida’s basic 
command for the count of legally cast votes is to consider the 
“intent of the voter.” (citations omitted.)This is unobjection-
able as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. The 
problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to      
ensure its equal application. The formulation of uniform 
rules to determine intent based on these recurring            
circumstances is practicable and, we conclude, necessary. . . . 
The want of those rules here has led to unequal evaluation 
of ballots in various respects. . . . As seems to have been 
acknowledged at oral argument, the standards for accepting 
or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from    
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Court’s Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517, 524–30 (2000) [hereinafter 
The Road to Bush v. Gore]. This section draws on Ray’s analysis of Bush v. Gore as a per 
curiam opinion to illustrate how the opinion’s strained reasoning finds expression in the 
opinion’s voice and especially in its departure from genre-based voice. In considering the 
plurality’s use of the per curiam opinion form in Bush v. Gore, Ray suggests a number of 
motivating factors, including the exigencies surrounding the issuance of the opinion, an 
effort to create an “aura of consensus,” and the Court’s concern to limit the case to its 
unique context. Id. at 571–74. 
 156. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 157. This configuration of separate opinion authors identified the per curiam’s authors 
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county to county but indeed within a single county from one 
recount team to another.158   
Then the Court announced in a voice that combined over-
confidence and a certain disingenuousness that seven members of 
the Court concurred with its unprecedented constitutional      
analysis: “Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are        
constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida 
Supreme Court that demand a remedy [citing to Justice Souter’s 
and Justice Breyer’s dissents]. The only disagreement is as to the 
remedy.”159 
But, as commentator Laura Krugman Ray persuasively 
points out, for all the per curiam’s attempts to highlight that   
seven Justices identified an equal protection issue, only a bare 
majority of five agreed with the result of the per curiam’s equal 
protection rationale.160 Justices Souter and Breyer in dissent, 
while recognizing an equal protection issue, rejected the main 
opinion’s remedy to reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s order of 
a recount and in effect award the election to then Governor Bush. 
Rather, these dissenting Justices would have remanded the case 
to allow the recounting procedure to continue.161 And because 
even Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion added its own 
highly specific ground—that the Florida Supreme Court’s reading 
of Florida law violated the requirements of federal law for        
designating how Presidential electors will be selected162—it seems 
clear that the concurring members of the Court actually found the 
equal protection rationale for the main opinion to be too narrow to 
stand on its own.163  
Moreover, the per curiam opinion itself seemed to 
acknowledge the doctrinal anomaly it had introduced by almost 
immediately reversing course; after announcing the equal        
protection rationale for overturning the Florida Supreme Court, it 
disclaimed an intent to continue that line of equal protection 
analysis by limiting the holding to the particular circumstances.  
Here the Court wrote in a voice that exuded confidence in its legal 
  
 158. 531 U.S. at 105–06 (per curiam). 
 159. Id. at 111 (per curiam). 
 160. RAY, The Road to Bush v. Gore, supra note 155, at 572–73. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 572 (discussing Bush, 531 U.S. at 121–22 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). 
 163. Id. 
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analysis and then, without abandoning the confident tone, 
seemed to sidestep the import of announcing a new application of 
the equal protection doctrine by offering a self-limited holding: 
The recount process, in its features here described, is         
inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to   
protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special  
instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a   
single state judicial officer. Our consideration is limited to 
the present circumstances, for the problem of equal          
protection in election processes generally presents many 
complexities.164  
The absence, for example, of a transitional expression such as 
“however” to acknowledge for the reader this anomaly (“our con-
sideration is limited . . .”) hurried the reader along and seemed an 
effort to deflect attention from, rather than engage with, the im-
plications of its holding. 
The Court did not refer to the particularities of these ballot 
counting procedures as the reason for limiting the scope of its   
ruling but rather to the “complexities” of the equal protection  
issue in the election context. Yet reliance on the complexities of 
equal protection law as applied to the election context to limit the 
ruling seems perplexing, given the Court’s history of involvement 
in precisely that issue, a history that the per curiam documented 
to set up its equal protection rationale.165  The shift mid-
paragraph in authorial framing and emphasis from confident as-
sertion of the equal protection ground of decision to “self-effacing” 
limitation166 in abandoning that ground as a basis for further doc-
trinal development, alerts us to an unresolved rupture in the 
Court’s underlying reasoning.167  And in its show of reticence to 
continue the line of equal protection analysis beyond the “present 
circumstances,” the per curiam seemed to depart from the        
  
 164. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam) (quoted in part in RAY, The Road to Bush v. 
Gore, supra note 155, at 574). 
 165. Id. at 104–05, 107 (per curiam) (discussing equal protection precedent in voting 
context).  
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2015 Understanding Voice 229 
authoritative and justifying voice that we associate with the   
functions, and hence the genre, of the judicial opinion.  
The internal contradictions continued in the per curiam’s    
insistence that the Court acted with awareness of the limits on its 
role when in fact it adopted a remedy that impaired voters’ efforts 
to exercise the franchise. Here, the Court wrote with a voice that 
sounded a concern for proving its bona fides:  
None are more conscious of the limits on judicial authority 
than are the Members of this Court, and none stand more in 
admiration of the Constitution’s design to leave the selection 
of the President to the people, through their legislatures, 
and to the political sphere.168  
Given that, in actuality, the Court followed a path not of     
restraint, but rather of considerable overreach into a state’s    
administration of its election procedures, its protestations of    
unwilling involvement in the case rang hollowly:  
When contending parties invoke the process of the courts, 
however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve 
the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has 
been forced to confront.169  
As dissenting Justice Breyer observed in a measured judicial 
voice grounded in enduring institutional concerns, the Court, 
while espousing the rhetoric of restraint, failed to “adequately 
attend[ ] to that ‘necessary check upon our own exercise of power,’ 
‘our own sense of self-restraint.’”170  
The per curiam’s fastidiousness in expressing its due respect 
for the separation of powers offers another revealing glimpse of 
how voice and reasoning are mutually implicated. Here, the     
authorial anxiety betrayed in the opinion’s repeated assurances 
that the Court had not overstepped its role suggested the oppo-
site: its strained vocalizations signaled the strains in the per    
curiam’s reasoning and the lack of internal consistency and         
coherence that a more solidly grounded opinion would have     
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provided. At the same time, the sense of judicial unease does not 
square with an opinion’s genre-based voice of authoritative      
justification. 
Using voice in this way as an aid to interpreting Casey,      
Michael H., and Bush v. Gore bears some resemblance to a        
variation of voice that Peter Elbow refers to as “resonant voice,” 
which he has described as “often correlat[ing] with places where a 
text has a hole or crack or disjuncture.”171 Elbow considers that 
resonant voice has the “self’s resources behind or underneath 
it”172 and thus suggests that it can be more revealing of the      
author, if less than a self-portrait.173 Complicating Elbow’s con-
ception is the particular way in which judicial opinion voice sub-
sumes genres and multiple authorial contributions. Thus, it 
would be challenging to identify the “self” whose resources are 
revealed. Yet Elbow’s formulation gets at something important 
about attentiveness to voice: shifts in modulation of judicial    
opinion voice can illuminate ruptures in reasoning and coherence 
that are critical to discern—that can be heard—in the work of 
judicial interpretation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article offers a framework for understanding judicial 
opinion voice as an interpretive resource to enable deep readings 
of judicial opinions. It first addresses the complexity of voice as a 
concept and, drawing on the work of literary theory and its       
application to legal writing, it posits that judicial opinion voice 
has two aspects. Genre-based voice is rooted in the function, con-
text, and audience of judicially oriented writing and the other, 
authorial voice, is linked to the identity and distinctive rhetorical 
choices of judicial authors. Neither of these aspects is unitary. 
Genre-based judicial opinion voice subsumes within it functions of 
bench memos and advocacy briefs reflecting the ways in which 
these writings exist in relation to opinions. Similarly, authorial 
judicial voice is never singular but typically reflects multiple   
authorial contributions and perspectives.  
  
 171. Elbow, supra note 7, at 13.   
 172. Id. at 14. 
 173. Id.  
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Although these aspects of judicial opinion voice are            
conceptually related and at times overlapping, the Article has 
treated them as analytically distinct to convey the nuanced and 
multi-faceted way in which voice operates.  Having developed this 
more complex formulation of voice, this Article has suggested that 
attention to judicial voice in its multiplicity can serve as an entry 
point for a deeper analysis of judicial rhetoric, one which helps to 
explain the trajectory of a court’s reasoning and doctrinal         
perspective. Using voice as interpretive method can lead us to 
intervals in judicial writing where crucial, if often        
unacknowledged, analytic shifts or glosses may occur and         
illuminates tensions and discordance in jurisprudential approach. 
Applying the framework developed here for analyzing judicial 
opinion voice offers another resource for the difficult work of     
interpretation, and the search for evidence of principled decision 
making, or its absence, that all close readers of opinions strive to 
achieve.  
 
 
 
 
 
